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Abstract 
In 2014, half a decennium after the eruption of the financial crises, the bail-in mechanism was 
introduced as a new pan-European legal tool in order to avoid the financial inefficiencies of 
the public bail-out of banks and financial institutions. Yet the system is still not immune from 
criticism. The dilemma that the new EU legislation has left unsolved relates to the excessive 
level of discretion still left to the resolution authority regarding the way in which the rights of 
stakeholders of the bailed-in bank (shareholders and bondholders) can be sacrificed.   
Against this background, the paper attempts to discuss and analyse, via a methodology which 
is both theoretical and empirical, the legal provisions encompassed by the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive and its applications to credit institutions within the context of recent 
crises. From a more epistemological point of view, the contribution aims to shed light on 
whether the new resolution tools still lie within the macro-area of the insolvency or, by contrast, 
they represent a new genus of crisis. More philosophically and intriguingly, the research 
examines whether, in light of the extensive powers granted to the resolution authority by the 
recent EU legislation, banking activity may still be regarded in Europe as business of a private 
nature. 
Bail-in, Bank insolvency, bank resolution, MREL, no-creditor-worse-off, uncertainties, 
resolvability,  priority of creditors, scope of bail-in, bail-in tools 
 
1. Resolution and Resolution Tools: Their Nature  
1.1. The Concept of Resolvability  
 
In the BRRD architecture,1 resolution plans and early intervention measures should suffice for 
purposes of preventing a bank crisis. Yet, should these measures prove ineffective, the powers 
                                                             
* Full Professor in Law in England and Wales, FHEA & University of Padova, Law School. 
⁑ Lecturer in Law at Canterbury Christ Church University. 
1 The first draft of the BRRD was published by the European Commission (EC) on 6 June 2012, with the full title: 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery 
and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 
82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, 2012/0150 (COD). An initial commentary on the BRRD proposal can be read in: 
Matthias Haentjens, Bank Recovery and Resolution: An Overview of International Initiatives in Matthias 
Haentjens and Bob Wessels (eds), Bank Recovery and Resolution. A Conference Book, 3,22 (The Hague; 
Eleven Publishers, 2014); Tim Verdoes, Jan Adriaanse and Anthon Verweij, Bank Recovery Plans: Strengths and 
Weaknesses – How to Make a Boiling Banker Frog Jump in Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels (eds), Bank 
Recovery and Resolution. A Conference Book, 25,47 (The Hague; Eleven Publishers, 2014); Stephen Madaus, 
Bank Failure and Pre-emptive Planning in Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels (eds), Bank Recovery and 
Resolution. A Conference Book, 49, 76 (Eleven Publishers, The Hague 2014); Simone Mezzacapo, Towards a 
New Regulatory Framework for Banking Recovery and Resolution in the EU , Law and Economics Yearly Review 
213,241 (2013) See also European Commission, EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD): 
Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/14/297 (2014) in  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
297_en.htm (accessed on 3 July 2014). 
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vested in the resolution authority extend to the consideration of even more extreme measures, 
represented as a group under the third pillar of the BRRD and termed ‘resolution’. 2 
Interestingly, ‘resolution’ is not a term specifically defined by the EU legislature. In an almost 
circular way, Art. 2 of the BRRD merely stipulates that ‘resolution’ means the application of a 
resolution tool3 in order to achieve one or more of the resolution objectives4 to ensure the 
continuity of an institution’s critical functions, to avoid a significant adverse effect on the 
financial system as a whole, and to protect public funds, depositors and investors.  
 
However, a definition of resolvability is indeed provided in the BRRD. According to Art. 15(1), 
part 1, BRRD, the resolution authority assesses ‘the extent to which an institution which is not 
part of a group is resolvable’.  The legal provision goes on to stipulate that the institution shall 
be resolvable ‘if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under 
normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying the different resolution tools and 
powers to the institution while avoiding to the maximum extent possible any significant adverse 
effect on the financial system …’.5 The norm, apparently transparent, confirms in reality that 
the area between resolution tools and ordinary insolvency proceedings is extremely blurred, 
and perhaps manipulated by the EU legislator. Upon closer scrutiny, the credit institution 
should be resolvable exclusively in cases where the application of resolution tools can avoid 
any significant adverse effect on the financial system. Therefore, the first limb of the definition 
seems to be unnecessary and perhaps contradictory, in comparing the nature of the resolution 
tools with one of the traditional insolvency proceedings.  
The actual assessment of the resolvability, according to Art. 16, BRRD, shall be carried out by 
the group-level resolution authority. This authority, ‘together with the resolution authorities of 
subsidiaries, after consulting the consolidating supervisor and the competent authorities of such 
subsidiaries, …, will assess the extent to which groups are resolvable…’. In assessing this, the 
authorities will disregard certain assumptions that may be defined as biased and causing market 
distortions. In more detail, as inferable from Art. 16(1), BRRD, in the assessment of the 
resolvability, the ‘extraordinary public financial support’ should not influence the choice of the 
authority. Similarly, ‘any central bank emergency liquidity assistance’ should not be included 
in the evaluation by the resolution authority; nor, finally, should any central bank liquidity 
assistance provided under non-standard collateralization, tenor and interest rate terms.’6       
 
1.2. The Conditions of Resolution  
                                                             
2 Artt. 31 ff BRRD. An exhaustive overview and commentary of the final and official text of the BRRD can be 
read in Jens-Hinrich Binder and Dalvinder Singh (eds), Bank Resolution: the European Regime (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2016); Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Bail-in in the Banking Union 53 Common Market Law 
Review 91,138 (2016); Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels (eds), Research Handbook on Crisis Management 
in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2015).  
3 See art. 37 headed ‘General principles of resolution tools’ and art. 58 ‘Temporary public ownership tool’ of the 
BRRD. 
4 See art. 31(2) of the BRRD. In detail, the objectives are: 
(a) to ensure the continuity of critical functions; 
(b) to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system, in particular by preventing contagion, including to 
market infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline; 
(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support;  
(d) to protect depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by directive 97/9/EC; 
(e) to protect client funds and client assets. 
5 Art. 15(1)(let. b), para 1, BRRD. 
6 Art. 15(1)(let. c), para 1, BRRD.  
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Conditions for the resolution or, better, for the adoption of one of the ‘resolution tools’ are 
threefold. First, the relevant authority must assess that ‘the institution [is] failing or [is] likely 
to fail’.7 Second, it must judge that ‘there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private 
sector measures [..] would prevent the failure of the institution’ within a reasonable timeframe;8 
and third, it must conclude that ‘a resolution action is necessary in the public interest’.9 Equally 
important is the circumstance that the resolution goal is to avoid disruption in the provision of 
essential banking services - in essence, deposits and payment services - and to restore the 
institution’s economic viability.10 In this respect the lesson learnt during the financial crisis is 
still echoing in the financial markets. The collapse of banks, in the manner experienced during 
the 2007 financial crisis, may affect their main and fundamental function as paymasters: a 
consequence that the BRRD aims to completely prevent.  
 
Furthermore, the resolution measures are expected to apply exclusively in acute bank crises.11 
Ultimately, resolution tools are extreme measures that the supervisory authority uses in cases 
where no other weaponry is available.12 As a result of this brief description, it is inferable from 
the reading of the new legal framework that the only alternative to the resolution is the winding 
up of the institution. This winding-up will not ward off a crisis; rather it simply marks the end 
of the bank as a business entity doing business. Art. 32, BRRD, stipulates that a resolution 
action can be taken only when the resolution authority considers that all of the three conditions 
provided by Art. 32 itself are met.  
In this scenario, and if the relevant conditions are met, the resolution authorities shall be entitled 
to use the following five resolution tools:13 1) the appointment of a ‘special manager’ taking 
                                                             
7 According to Article 32 of the BRRD, an institution is ‘failing or likely to fail’ when i) the assets of the company 
are, or will likely to be in the near future, less than its liabilities, or ii) the institution infringes, or will likely 
infringe in the near future, the requirements for continuing the authorisation (capital requirements, in general) in 
a way that justifies its withdrawal by the competent authority, or iii) the institution is, or will likely be in the near 
future, unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due, or, finally, iv) the institution requires an 
extraordinary level of financial support. As for the last condition, it is worth noting that not any degree of 
extraordinary financial support makes the institution a failing or likely-to-fail entity. In this respect, Art. 32(4)(d) 
of the BRRD refers to a number of exceptions, such as certain cases of public financial assistance, provided that 
this assistance meets various conditions, such as its precautionary and temporary nature, as well as its 
proportionate character.  
8 The implementation of an early intervention measure and/or the write-down or the conversion of contractual 
instruments. 
9 Art. 32 BRRD. More specifically, according to Art. 32(5) a resolution action is in the public interest when i) it 
is necessary for the achievement of one or more resolution objectives, ii) it is proportionate to these aims, and iii) 
the winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet resolution objectives to 
the same extent. In summary, this third condition shows that this kind of public intervention in the crisis of an 
institution is first justified if it ensures the continuation of the institution’s critical functions or to provide security 
for depositors; in short, only if it achieves the “resolution objectives” listed in Article 31 BRRD. Public 
intervention, then, is only justified if, compared with normal insolvency proceedings, it offers a way of better 
achieving those objectives. Otherwise, the insolvent institution should not be saved but liquidated. De Poli Matteo, 
European Banking Law, 217 (Wolters Kluwer Italia, Assago 2017). 
10 This is spelled out by Art. 34 of the BRRD, heading ‘General principles governing resolution’. 
11 In fact, Article 32(1) (let. a) BRRD asks whether the institution has failed or is likely to fail. 
12 De Poli Matteo, European Banking Law, 229 (Wolters Kluwer Italia, Assago 2017). De Poli correctly highlights 
that, in a scenario of extreme urgency, national resolution authorities may take resolution actions without waiting 
until early intervention measures have been applied. 
13 The ‘resolution tools’ are detailed under Art. 37 ff BRRD. 
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over the failing institution’s management;14 2) the sale of the business or the shares of the 
institution concerned, without the prior approval of the board of directors or the shareholders, 
to a private sector purchaser; 15  3) a measure whereby the assets and/or liabilities of the 
institution at stake are transferred to an alternate entity owned, wholly or partly, by the 
resolution authority (such an entity is referred to as a ‘bridge institution’);16 4) a similar transfer 
may be effectuated with non-viable assets to a vehicle that is commonly denoted as a ‘bad 
bank’ (in a process defined as ‘asset separation’);17 and 5) the final measure – and probably the 
most controversial18 contemplated within the BRRD – is the ‘bail-in tool’.19  
 
 
2. Bail-in Tool 
2.1. The Essence of the ‘Bail-In’  
 
It is difficult to say whether philosophically the bail-in mechanism is more effective and 
therefore better than the bail-out counterpart. Discussions on this subject have been rather 
heated for some time.20 The bail-in tool is theoretically ‘salubrious’ as it makes the public 
subsidy entailed in the bail-out unnecessary. However, the bail-in converts this into a ‘private 
penalty’ for the creditors,21 with modalities that, as critically assessed in this paper, are still 
shrouded in uncertainty and to a certain extent contradictory. 22  Although it is correctly 
emphasised that the bail-in is a method which allows the creditors to intensify bank 
monitoring,23 the increased prospective risk may raise the cost of funding24 or even alienate 
the classes of investors on which the banking system traditionally relies, namely depositors. 
On the positive side, it is emphasised that the way creditors are treated in a bail-in should be 
geared towards removing the psychological cover of the too-big-to-fail attitude which certain 
banks usually possess, as well as the governance costs associated with excessive leverage.25  
Further, and by no means least important, the bail-in prevents bankers’ ‘moral hazard implied 
                                                             
14 Some scholars (e.g. De Poli Matteo, European Banking Law 214(Wolters Kluwer Italia, Assago 2017)) are 
reluctant to regard the appointment of a special manager as a special tool. As a result of this epistemological 
approach, the number of resolution tools would be four. 
15 Art. 37(3)(a) BRRD. The specific modalities of this tool are detailed under Art. 38 and Art. 39 BRRD. 
16 Art. 37(1)(b). Art. 40 and art. 41 BRRD contain the details of this procedure. 
See, commenting on the draft directive rather than the final statute, Stephen Madaus, Bank Failure and Pre-
emptive Planning in Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels (eds), Bank Recovery and Resolution, 61,62 (Eleven 
Publishers, The Hague 2004).  
17 Art. 37(1)(c) BRRD. For the details of this resolution tool, see Art. 42 BRRD.  
18 The definition is utilised by Stephen Madaus, Bank Failure and Pre-emptive Planning in Matthias Haentjens 
and Bob Wessels (eds), Bank Recovery and Resolution, 63 (Eleven Publishers, The Hague 2004). 
19 The terminology is reminiscent of the opposite mechanism of the bail-out, which conversely implies the use of 
tax-payers’ money to bail-out a credit institution. 
20 John C. Coffee Jr, Bail-ins versus Bail-outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate Systemic Risk, The Centre 
for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law, Working Paper No. 380, 35 (2010).  
21 Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, An Anatomy of Bank Bail-ins. Why the European Needs a Fiscal 
Backdrop for the Banking Sector, European Economy 76 (2016). 
22 See this paper.  
23 Emilios Avgouleas, Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective, 
University of Edinburgh, Working Paper (2014). 
24 Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, An Anatomy of Bank Bail-ins. Why the European Needs a Fiscal 
Backdrop for the Banking Sector, European Economy 76 (2016). 
25 Emilios Avgouleas and Jay Cullen, Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking 
Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries 42 Journal of Law and Society 28, 50 (2014).  
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by the public bailout’,26 as ‘any kind of recourse to extraordinary public financial support will 
now normally entail at least some burden-sharing (and loss absorption) by shareholders and 
creditors …’.27   
Nevertheless, bail-ins are not a panacea.28 Usually, bail-ins allocate a part of the losses of the 
bank to senior creditors. However, theoretically, unless some exemptions are embedded into 
the regulation, the bail-ins may even spread the risk, in cases where these creditors were other 
banks.29 
Astutely, it can be affirmed that the current regulation in the area of the bail-in is still the 
outcome of the traumatic events of the 2007-2008 financial crises. Given the fact that the bail-
out is by definition a form of moral hazard and that it undermines market discipline,30 as well 
as destabilising public finances and public debt,31 the easiest way - and probably the most 
simplistic one – in the immediate post-crisis years was to move to the opposite regime: the bail-
in. In a more Machiavellian way, it cannot be denied that in the shift, or more realistically the 
sea-change, from the bail-out to the bail-in there is also an inkling of the nemesis of politicians 
against bankers. The former needed to pay the costly bills of the 2007-2008 financial crises, 
with the latter returning the bill few years later by firing the weapons of a legal mechanism that 
does not seem to dispense any kind of mercy to the avid banker.      
Beyond doubt, the purpose of the BRRD is to avoid public bail-outs of private institutions.32 
In this respect, Recital 67 of the BRRD is clear when it stipulates:  
‘An effective resolution regime should minimise the costs of the resolution of a failing 
institution borne by the taxpayers. It should ensure that systemic institutions can be resolved 
without jeopardising financial stability. The bail-in tool achieves that objective by ensuring 
that shareholders and creditors of the failing institution suffer appropriate losses and bear an 
appropriate part of the costs arising from the failure of the institution. The bail-in tool will 
therefore give shareholders and creditors of institutions a stronger incentive to monitor the 
health of an institution during the normal circumstances and meets the Financial Stability Board 
recommendations that statutory debt-write down and conversion powers be included in a 
framework for resolution, as an additional option in conjunction with other resolution tools.’ 
The definition itself of the bail-in tool, encompassed within the BRRD, in Art. 2(1), point 57, 
reveals the invasive purpose entailed in this instrument: ‘the mechanism of effecting the 
exercise by a resolution authority of the write-down and conversion powers in relation to the 
                                                             
26  Simone Alvaro, Marco Lamandini, David Ramos Muñoz, Elena Ghibellini, Francesca Pellegrini, MREL 
Securities after BRRD: The Interplay between Prudential, Resolution and Transparency Requirements and the 
Challenges which Lie Ahead, CONSOB, Commissione Nazionale per le Societa’ e la Borsa, Quaderni Giuridici,21 
(2017). 
27 Ibid.  
28 Chris Bates and Simon Gleeson, Legal Aspects of Bank Bail-ins 5 Law and Financial Markets Review 265 
(2011). 
29 Ibid.  
30 Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, An Anatomy of Bank Bail-ins. Why the Eurozone Needs a Fiscal 
Backstop for the Banking Sector, European Economy 7 (2016).  
31 Ibid.  
32 For an example of bail-out, see Pierre de Gioia Carabellese, Corporate Governance of British Banks and Duties 
of Directors: Practical Implications of the Royal Bank of Scotland’s Demise 2 Law and Economics Yearly Review 
134-165 (2014). 
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liabilities of an institution under resolution ...’ Ultimately, in the words of the best literature,33 
the bail-in consists of ‘powers conferred on resolution authorities to provide for restoring the 
capital of the failing or likely to fail institution through alternative actions of i) a debt write-
down, ii) conversion of liabilities into ordinary shares and other instruments of ownership or 
other capital instruments, or iii) a cancellation or dilution of shares or other instruments of 
ownership.’34 Rebus sic stantibus, the bail-in, as the stereotypical resolution proceeding, is not 
‘an insolvency procedure within the strict sense of the term.’35 Given the full or partial write-
down of a bank’s liabilities which may engender ‘the cancellation of certain parties’ credit 
positions with the consequence that they cannot, even in theory, participate in the distribution 
of any remaining assets’, 36  this may drive a coach and horses through the par condicio 
creditorum principles, where a joint participation of all the creditors encapsulates the very 
nature of the phenomenon.  
2.2. The Bail-In: A Historical View 
The bail-in mechanism has not made its debut from scratch in the BRRD. Historically, although 
this tool is the offspring of the 2007-2008 financial crises, it was the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) that in its Consultative Paper of August 201037 introduced for 
the first time, globally, the concept of so-called ‘contingent capital instruments’. In the 
document, as highlighted by scholars, 38  both private investors and creditors of banks are 
required to ‘contribute to the rescue of banks that are facing difficulties.’39 The first proposal 
of the BCBS was to deny the right of the providers of the regulatory capital of the bank to 
reclaim the principal sums invested. The providers of regulatory capital instruments are not all 
the creditors of the bank, but rather, exclusively those participating in the core equity 
instruments, the Core Equity Tier 1, or in hybrid instruments or in Tier 2 instruments.40 These 
regulatory capital instruments are subordinated should the bank get through a liquidation or 
insolvency. According to the BCBS, this purpose would have been achieved either via a write-
off of the principal or the conversion of debt obligations into equity, relating to these 
‘providers’.   
Nevertheless, from an empirical point of view, it is undeniable that, by briefly comparing the 
initial proposals of bail-in regulation with the new legislative framework that was eventually 
passed, there has been a significant last-minute shift. In the early stages the intention was to 
put in place a real burden-sharing of the losses of the bank. In particular, in cases where the 
authorities had decided to rescue a bank, ‘then the proposal would give the regulatory 
authorities the option to require regulatory capital instruments (other than common shares) to 
                                                             
33 De Poli Matteo, European Banking Law, 224 (Wolters Kluwer Italia, Assago 2017). 
34 On this aspect, see later Chapter 4.4. 
35 Raffaele Lener and Edoardo Rulli, Liabilities Excluded from Bail-in: Implications under Italian and EU Law 
32 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 428,429 (2017). 
36 Ibid. 
37 BCBS, Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non-viability, August 
(2010), www.bis.org (accessed 5 November 2017). 
38 Bart PM. Joosen, Bail-in Mechanism in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in Saskia MC. Nuijten, 
Bart PM. Joosen and Patrick Clancy (eds), The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, 41(Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2017).   
39 Ibid. at 24. 
40 Bart PM. Joosen, Bail-in Mechanism in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in Saskia MC. Nuijten, 
Bart PM. Joosen and Patrick Clancy (eds), The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, 41(Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2017). 
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be written-off or converted into common shares.’41 Conversely, in the BRRD, the bail-in has 
been conceived in a way that is at a first glance a penalisation of both creditors and 
shareholders, 42  as both the latter (first and foremost) and the former (in cases where the 
sacrifice of the first is not enough) are required to bear the losses of the failing bank.   
Domestically, a primordial form of bail-in tool is the British legislation passed in 2009, in the 
aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crises: the Banking Act 2009. The Bank of England 
exercised the powers conferred according to that legislation in March 2009, when the assets of 
the Dunfermline Building Society were sold at auction. The successful bidder was Nationwide, 
and they acquired both the liabilities (retail and wholesale deposits) and the assets, with the 
exclusion of the social housing loans.43 As the value of the assets was lower than the liabilities 
that the Dunfermline assumed, the British Treasury paid to the purchaser a bonus of £1.6 
billion. 
 
3. The Scope of the Bail-in Tool 
In essence, the bail-in tool aims to recapitalise the failing bank, via the writing-off of the debt, 
either wholly or in part, and the conversion of debt into equity. In this respect, it is correctly 
highlighted 44  that the consequences of this process are, first and foremost, financial: the 
liabilities of the bank will be proportionally reduced and this should ultimately restore the 
balance sheet of the credit institution.45 In this conversion, the resolution authority will operate 
according to discretion. In fact, it will also be able to apply different conversion rates to 
different classes of liability.46 Second, the use of the bail-in tool may also engender corporate 
governance consequences: 47  the debt-holders, in becoming equity-holders, will become 
owners or at least co-owners of the credit institution and this may mean that this category of 
‘trans’ stake-holders will become in charge of the strategic decision of the bank.   
The deviation from the initial proposals on bail-in becomes obvious if attention is paid to the 
scope of the bail-in tool according to the legislature. Its general scope, which each Member 
State should pursue, is to ensure that ‘the bail-in may be applied to all liabilities of an institution 
…. that are not excluded from the scope of that tool …’.48 Although the initial intention was to 
apply the bail-in to specific liabilities (the providers of regulatory capital), the final solution, 
perhaps as a result of political pressures,49 has been somewhat different: in a slightly invasive 
                                                             
41 Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for more Resilient Bank and Banking Systems, www.bis.org (2010).   
42 Bart PM. Joosen, Bail-in Mechanism in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in Saskia MC. Nuijten, 
Bart PM. Joosen and Patrick Clancy (eds), The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, 41(Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2017) 
43 John Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffery N. Gordon, Colin Mayer, and Jennifer Payne, 
Principles of Financial Regulation, 352 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016). 
44 Ibid at 359. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid at 362. It is also correctly affirmed that creditors may receive unfair treatment in resolution.’ (ibid, at 355). 
Particularly in major banks where there are difficult classes of creditors, the discretionary power left to the 
resolution authority means that the future of each class will be difficult to predict (ibid. at 355).   
47 Ibid. at 359, 360. 
48 Art. 44(1), BRRD. 
49  Bart PM. Joosen, Bail-in Mechanism in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in Saskia MC. Nuijten, 
Bart PM. Joosen and Patrick Clancy (eds), The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, 41(Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2017). 
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way, to extend the scope of the bail-in tool to all the creditors, the ordinary creditors, with the 
exception of the ones specifically protected, such as covered depositors.  
The exclusions to which this legal provision refers are those under the following paragraphs 2 
and 3 of the same Art. 44(1). In more general terms, the bail-in is defined by the BRRD Art. 2, 
which refers to the bail-in tool as follows: 
‘the mechanism for effecting the exercise by a resolution authority of the write-down and 
conversion powers in relation to the liabilities of an institution under resolution…’.  
On these premises, among academic commentators it is highlighted that the bail-in tool is ‘a 
going-concern tool since it should enable resolution authorities to recapitalise the institution by 
charging shareholders and creditors of the institution an appropriate part of the costs arising 
from the failure of the institution …’.50 On the other hand, it is counter-claimed that the bail-
in tool is both a going-concern and a gone-concern instrument.51 The latter conclusion can be 
supported by the tenor of Recital 68 of the BRRD:  
‘In order to ensure that resolution authorities have the necessary flexibility to allocate losses to 
creditors in a range of circumstances, it is appropriate that those authorities be able to apply 
the bail-in tool where the objective is to resolve the failing institution as a going concern if 
there is a realistic prospect that the institution’s viability may be restored, and where 
systemically important services are transferred to a bridge institution and the residual part of 
the institution ceases to operate and is wound up’.    
However, it is recognised that, in the way the BRRD was originally envisaged (an instrument 
of contingent capital mechanism), the only circumstance of application of the bail-in was a 
point of non-viability. 
Ultimately, irrespective of these two contrasting stances, the bail-in mechanism applies to 
several hypotheses of bank crisis: shareholders and creditors of a bank that are involved with a 
rescue operation which otherwise would require public money, are expected to participate in 
the loss absorption to a full extent. Thanks to the suppression, in whole or in part, of these 
rights the bank should return to being a viable business.52 
    
4. Bail-in Tool and Priorities 
4.1. Priorities within the Resolution Tools 
 
In the literature, it is correctly emphasised that ‘all liabilities of a bank are bail-inable, unless 
expressly excluded by the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) Regulation or the BRRD’.53 
                                                             
50 De Poli Matteo, European Banking Law (Wolters Kluwer Italia, Assago 2017).  
51 Bart PM. Joosen, Bail-in Mechanism in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in Saskia MC Nuijten, 
Bart PM Joosen and Patrick Clancy (eds), The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, 29 (Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2017). 
52 Ibid at 29. 
53 CONSOB, Simone Alvaro, Marco Lamandini, David Ramos Muñoz, Elena Ghibellini, Francesca Pellegrini, 
MREL Securities after BRRD: The Interplay between Prudential, Resolution and Transparency Requirements and 
the Challenges which Lie Ahead, CONSOB, Commissione Nazionale per le Societa’ e la Borsa, Quaderni 
Giuridici, 22. (2017) 
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Art. 34 of the BRRD, which relates to all the resolution tools, stipulates that any resolution 
action, including the bail-in, is taken in accordance, amongst many, with one fundamental 
principle: the losses are borne first by shareholders of the institution and then by creditors, the 
latter in accordance with the order of priority of their claims under normal insolvency 
proceedings, save as expressly provided otherwise in the BRRD. More specifically, Art. 34(1) 
BRRD, headed ‘General principles governing resolution’, stipulates as follows:  
‘Member States shall ensure that, when applying the resolution tools and exercising the 
resolution powers, resolution authorities take all appropriate measures to ensure that the 
resolution action is taken in accordance with the following principles: 
(a) the shareholders of the institution under resolution bear first losses; 
(b) creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses after the shareholders in 
accordance with the order of priority of their claims under normal insolvency proceedings, save 
as expressly provided otherwise in this Directive; 
(c) management body and senior management of the institution under resolution are 
replaced, except in those cases when the retention of the management body and senior 
management, in whole or in part, as appropriate to the circumstances, is considered to be 
necessary for the achievement of the resolution objectives; 
(d) management body and senior management of the institution under resolution shall 
provide all necessary assistance for the achievement of the resolution objectives; 
(e) natural and legal persons are made liable, subject to Member State law, under civil or 
criminal law for their responsibility for the failure of the institution; 
(f) except where otherwise provided in this Directive, creditors of the same class are 
treated in an equitable manner; 
(g) no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the institution or 
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) had been wound up under normal 
insolvency proceedings in accordance with the safeguards in Articles 73 to 75; 
(h) covered deposits are fully protected; 
(i) resolution action is taken in accordance with the safeguards in this Directive.’ 
It can be inferred that the norm under discussion imposes an order of priority, as it is stipulated, 
under letter (b) of Art. 34(1) that the creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses 
‘after the shareholders’. Therefore, the first category to be sacrificed, in case of application of 
the bail-in tool, are those who invested in the equity of the bank. In more detail, if the bail-in 
to the detriment of the equity holders fails to be successful, based on the combined reading of 
Art. 34 (General principles of the resolution tools), Art. 31 (Resolution objectives),54 and Art. 
43, addressed exclusively to the bail-in tool,55 the mechanism under discussion shall be applied 
                                                             
54 See previous Section 2.1 above.  
55 Article 43, headed ‘The bail-in tool’ stipulates, in its first paragraph: 
‘In order to give effect to the bail-in tool, Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the resolution 
powers specified in Article 63(1).’ 
The second paragraph continues as follows: 
‘2.   Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may apply the bail-in tool to meet the resolution 
objectives specified in Article 31, in accordance with the resolution principles specified in Article 34 for any of 
the following purposes: 
(a) to recapitalise an institution or an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) of this Directive that 
meets the conditions for resolution to the extent sufficient to restore its ability to comply with the conditions for 
authorisation (to the extent that those conditions apply to the entity) and to continue to carry out the activities for 
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to the debt-holders, in addition to the equity-holders. This translates into the whole or partial 
conversion of the unsecured claims against the financial institution (i.e., debt instruments) into 
shares, and the write-off, in whole or in part, of existing unsecured claims.56  
Admittedly, commentators’ views on this are not totally uniform. Some suggest that the two 
main aspects of the bail-in (the conversion of equity of the distressed bank and the write-down-
write-off of debt instruments) are not alternatives, and are not considered according to an order 
of legal priority.57 Ergo, the resolution authority may use them according to its administrative 
discretion. Yet, it is undisputed that, as far as the conversion of debt into equity is concerned, 
there will be both financial and governance consequences for the bank affected by this 
measure.58 
Beyond these subtle interpretations, it must be affirmed that the norm is neither perspicuous 
nor technically precise. In a legal provision concerned with priorities, a commentator and 
interpreter would expect a perspicuous focus of the legislature on the classes. By contrast, the 
legal provision under discussion interconnects each of the priorities, on the one hand (letters 
(a) and (b)), and on the other hand general principles (letters (c) and (d)). Furthermore, letters 
(e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), seem to belong to a different genus. The same applies to the following 
Art. 48, which, instead of elucidating the matter, increases the uncertainty: with regard to the 
sequence in which the power to write down or convert liabilities should be applied within a 
resolution procedure, there is no precise harmonisation exercise. 59 This ‘pathology’ of the 
system is also made more serious, given the fact that Art. 42, BRRD, ‘provides a long list of 
liabilities excluded from the bail-in’. 60 In turn, this immediately creates ‘the incentive for 
creditors to plead that their liabilities are “out” of bail-in,’61 instead of “up” in the pecking 
order.  
Apart from this observation of an interpretative nature, it is not incorrect to advocate the view 
that the bank will result in being recapitalised, courtesy of the write-off, in whole or in part, of 
the shares, in order ‘to restore its ability to comply with the conditions for authorisation [..] and 
                                                             
which it is authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive 2014/65/EU, where the entity is authorised under 
those Directives, and to sustain sufficient market confidence in the institution or entity; 
(b) to convert to equity or reduce the principal amount of claims or debt instruments that are transferred: 
(i) to a bridge institution with a view to providing capital for that bridge institution; or 
(ii) under the sale of business tool or the asset separation tool.’ 
56 On possible friction between the Directive under discussion and the European Convention on Human Rights, 
particularly its Art. 1, the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, see Alexander Schild, Does the Directive 
on the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions provide Sufficient Fundamental Rights Protection? in 
Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels (eds), Bank Recovery and Resolution, 77, 85 (Eleven Publishers, The Hague 
2004). The conclusion seems to be as follows (A Schild, Ibid. at 85): ‘As long as the member states will dutifully 
implement the safeguards as set forth in the relevant provisions of the RRD, it is difficult to envisage a situation 
in which either Article 1 Protocol No. 1 or Article 13 of the Convention will be violated.’. 
57  Matthias Haentjens and Pierre de Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and Financial Law, Chapter 7 
(Routledge, London and New York 2015). 
58 John Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffery N. Gordon, Colin Mayer, and Jennifer Payne, 
Principles of Financial Regulation,  359 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016). It is highlighted that, as regards 
the first aspect (financial), ‘the bank’s liabilities are reduced by the amount of the write-off or conversion and the 
demands on the bank’s cash flows are reduced by the removal of the requirement to pay interest on the debt written 
off or converted.’ As far as the corporate governance is concerned, ‘where the former debt-holders become equity 
holders, control of the bank may pass into new hands.’ (Ibid. at 359)  
59 This has recently been emphasised by CONSOB, at 25. 
60 CONSOB, at 25. 
61 CONSOB, at 25. 
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to continue to carry out the activities for which it is authorised [..].’62 The write-off process 
should be the first attempt of bail-in, as the equity holders are by definition exposed to the risk 
of the enterprise. 
Nevertheless, the sacrifice that the shareholders are required to make may be, upon closer 
scrutiny, just symbolic and even unnecessary. If a bank is failing or is close to failure, it is 
highly likely that this has already reverberated on the value of the shares, particularly if listed. 
In this scenario, it appears unclear why the shareholders, in addition to the stress of seeing their 
shares plunge, are expected to be deprived of their ownership. In this respect, the norm appears 
a futile exercise in sadism, exercised by the supervisory authority against a specific category 
of stakeholders of the bank.     
4.2. Priorities and Insolvency Proceedings 
 
Art. 108, BRRD, stipulates, as regards deposits, a form of hierarchy that should be implemented 
in each jurisdiction, in the case of insolvency proceedings. The norm, explicitly applicable to 
cases of insolvency, is not necessarily concerned with the resolution tool, which by contrast is 
aimed at avoiding the insolvency. At the same level of hierarchy, there are both ‘part of eligible 
deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds 
the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU’ (let. a(i), art. 108, BRRD) 
and ‘deposits that would be eligible deposits from natural persons, micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises were they not made through branches located outside the Union of institutions 
established within the Union.’ (let. a(ii), art. 108, BRRD). The separate category, which will 
be ranked higher than that just referred to above, is represented by the ‘covered deposits’ (lett. 
b(i)) and the ‘deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered 
depositors in insolvency’ (lett. b(ii)). 
This scenario will soon change, once the new amendments to Art. 108, BRRD, have been 
implemented. In greater detail, given the inclusion of a new category of debt instruments, 
courtesy of an amendment to Art. 2(1), point 48, BRRD, these new debt instruments will be 
ranked after those listed in the previous paragraph. These claims resulting from unsecured debt 
instruments shall comply with a number of criteria. They will have an original contractual 
maturity of at least one year, they do not contain embedded derivatives, and they are not 
derivatives themselves. Finally, the prospectus shall explicitly refer to their lower ranking 
under normal insolvency proceedings. This non-preferred senior class of debt instruments shall 
meet the eligibility criteria of the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC), which the G-20, in 
November 2015, identified in order to ensure that global systemically important banks ‘have 
the loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity necessary to help ensure that, in and 
immediately following a resolution, critical functions can be continued without taxpayers’ 
funds (public funds) or financial stability being put at risk’.              
  
5. Bail-in Tool and ‘No-creditor-worse-off’ Principle 
                                                             
62 Art. 43(2)(a) BRRD. Pursuant to Art. 43(2)(b) BRRD, such recapitalisation can also be used in the bridge 
institution tool and asset management vehicle. 
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In this paper, emphasis has already been placed on the fact that no creditor is expected to suffer 
greater losses than they would have suffered if the institution had been liquidated under 
ordinary insolvency proceedings (the ‘no-creditor-worse-off’ principle). This principle is 
quintessential as it potentially aims to protect shareholders and creditors who may realise that 
potentially they have been affected by the application of any - and not just the bail-in - 
resolution tool.63 Merely implied by the principle, albeit made explicit in the literature,64 is the 
idea that claims within the same rank ‘must be reduced pari passu among themselves’.  
Upon closer scrutiny, the legal provision hides a couple of insidious and tricky conundrums. 
The first one is that the supervisory authority needs to ascertain in advance, with a prognosis 
of both a financial and an accounting nature, how the position of the shareholders and creditors 
would have evolved without the intervention of the resolution tool. 65  The answer would 
probably be positive, by definition, although the hypotheses are multifarious. The second issue 
is more technical. Assuming that the tool has been applied incorrectly, as the shareholders and 
creditors in reality would not have been worse off had the tool been avoided, it is not obvious 
whether the resolution authority can be sued for damages by one of the representatives of these 
categories. Given the fact that the matter is left to the laws and jurisdictions of each bank 
involved, and given the lack of precedents, it is possible to suggest that a duty of care is owed 
by the supervisor to the protected categories at stake (shareholders and creditors), ergo leading 
to the possibility of using the general principles of tort law in order to protect the victim against 
the tortious conduct of the supervisor.  
Admittedly, the liability of the resolution authority for tortious conduct can be potentially 
lessened by the application of the legal provision under Art. 36 of the BRRD. The norm requires 
the supervisor to use an independent valuer, as the first step of the process. The rationale behind 
this is that the purpose of the BRRD is to keep the bank operating as a going concern. In reality, 
as the use of the bail-in tool may materialise in the dramatic circumstances of an emergency, 
where every moment is precious, the BRRD allows the authority to carry out an ex post 
valuation.66    
Needless to say, covered deposits, under the third pillar of the Banking Union, are required to 
be protected in full.67 The rationale behind this is obvious: by allowing the covered depositors 
to be bumped off the protection, there would be an internal conflict between two of the three 
pillars of the banking European Union. 
                                                             
63 De Poli Matteo, European Banking Law, 228 (Wolters Kluwer Italia, Assago 2017). 
64  Simone Alvaro, Marco Lamandini, David Ramos Muñoz, Elena Ghibellini, Francesca Pellegrini, MREL 
Securities after BRRD: The Interplay between Prudential, Resolution and Transparency Requirements and the 
Challenges which Lie Ahead, CONSOB, Commissione Nazionale per le Societa’ e la Borsa, Quaderni Giuridici, 
23 (2017). 
65 In the literature and well before the body of law of the BRRD entered into force, commentators (Karl-Philipp 
Kojcik, Bail-in in the Banking Union 53 Common Market Law Review 124 (2016)) had already highlighted that 
the comparison would be based on a number of assumptions, ‘since insolvency proceedings usually take time, 
depend on the application of specific rules by courts or administrative authorities which decide depending on 
specific motions or situations of creditors.’ 
66 John Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffery N. Gordon, Colin Mayer, and Jennifer Payne, 
Principles of Financial Regulation, 361(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016). 
67 As far as depositors are concerned, the protection is afforded to ‘covered deposits,’ i.e., all deposits up to 
€100,000. This protection includes deposits in a current account, savings deposits, and funds invested in a 
certificate of deposit, whereas bonds issued by the insolvent bank are not covered.  
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Nonetheless, the rights of the creditors protected under the DGS Directive shall remain 
unaffected. Ultimately, the underpinning philosophy of the resolution tools is that ‘no financial 
institution shall be unconditionally protected from an orderly market exit [..]’.68 As regards the 
groups of banks, in the general principles governing the resolution (art. 34, BRRD), it is 
stipulated that resolution authorities will apply ‘resolution tools and exercise powers in a way 
that minimises the impact of other group entities and on the group as a whole and minimises 
the adverse effect on financial stability in the Union and its Member States, in particular, in the 
countries where the group operates.’ 
    
6. Bail-in Tool and Exempted Liabilities  
 
Art. 44(2), BRRD,69 lists the liabilities that can be in no way subjected to a write-down or a 
conversion in equity.70 Together with covered deposits, these liabilities will not be affected by 
the application of the bail-in tool. Among these, mention can be made of: i) secured liabilities, 
as covered bonds; ii) liabilities to employees, liabilities to commercial or trade creditors, 
liabilities to tax and social security authorities; and iii) liabilities to credit institutions and 
investment firms, excluding entities that are part of the same group, with an original maturity 
of fewer than seven days. Remarkably, Art. 44(3) encompasses exceptional circumstances 
where certain liabilities, not automatically excluded from the application of the write-down or 
conversion powers, may be included after a specific resolution of the resolution authority.71  
Within the legal framework of discretionary exclusions, the EBA-issued guidelines are devoted 
to limiting this broad power.72 Additionally, Regulation 2016/860, which came into force on 4 
                                                             
68 Simone Mezzacapo, Towards a New Regulatory Framework for Banking Recovery and Resolution in the EU, 
Law and Economics Yearly Review (part 1) 211 (2013). 
69 Article 44(2), BRRD, headed ‘Scope of the bail-in tool’. 
70 An analysis concerned with the bail-in was orchestrated in Italy in respect of the Venetian banks, Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, see Raffaele Lener and Edoardo Rulli, Liabilities Excluded from Bail-in: 
Implications under Italian and EU Law 32 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 428-438 (2017). 
For a broader discussion of empirical cases of bail-in, see Financial Sector Advisory Center (FinSAC), Bank 
Resolution and “Bail-in” in the EU: selected Case Studies Pre and Post BRRD World Bank Group, in 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/120651482806846750/FinSAC-BRRD-and-Bail-In-CaseStudies.pdf> (2017). 
71 The relevant circumstances are the following: i) it is not possible to subject to bail-in a particular liability within 
a reasonable time, notwithstanding the efforts of the resolution authority made in good faith; or ii) the exclusion 
is strictly necessary to achieve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines in a manner that 
maintains the ability of the institution to continue essential operations, services, and transactions; or iii) the 
exclusion is strictly necessary and proportionate to avoid giving rise to widespread contagion, which would 
severely disrupt the functioning of financial markets in a manner that could bring about a grave disturbance to the 
economy of a Member State or of the Union; or finally iv) the application of the bail-in tool to those liabilities 
would cause a destruction in value such that losses borne by other creditors would be higher than if those liabilities 
were excluded from bail-in. When a certain liability has been excluded from the application of the bail-in, the 
level of a write-down or conversion of other liabilities will likely be increased to take account of this exclusion. 
However, the additional burden on creditors affected by the bail-in shall occur in accordance with the ‘no-creditor-
worse-off’ principle. 
72  EBA/Op/2015/07 of 6 March 2015, Technical advice on the delegated acts on the circumstances when 
exclusions from the bail-in tool are necessary. For more details, see Raffaele Lener and Edoardo Rulli, Liabilities 
Excluded from Bail-in: Implications under Italian and EU Law 32 Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation 428,438  (2017) 
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February 2016,73 has further reduced the area of this discretion. In detail, as commented on by 
scholars,74 the Regulation clarifies the hypotheses where the liabilities can be excluded. In that 
respect, it must be complied with by national resolution authorities, by the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB) as a resolution authority in the banking union, and by the Commission when 
prohibiting or requesting amendments to the exclusion proposed by a resolution authority. 
Finally, resolution authorities have the power to write down and convert capital instruments of 
the distressed institution.75 The implementation of the power to write down and to convert 
capital instruments produces effects comparable to those achieved by the application of the 
bail-in tool. The write-down and the conversion of capital instruments are additional 
instruments since they can be exerted either in conjunction with a resolution action, or 
independently of it, when the following conditions occur: i) the entity can be placed under 
resolution but no action has yet been carried out; ii) the competent authority determines that 
non-write-down or non-conversion would affect the viability of the entity; iii) the entity 
requires extraordinary public financial support.76 
 
7. Uncertainties of bail-ins 
This section will examine two uncertainties associating with bail-ins: the dilemmas arising 
from MREL; the conditions to initiate bail-ins. In this respects, some Italian and Cypriot cases 
provide egregious food for thought. 
7.1.  Uncertainties from MREL 
As it has been examined in the last Section 6, since resolution authorities enjoy discretion to 
exempt certain categories of debts from the list of bail-inable liabilities,77 one given bank has 
to maintain a minimum requirement of designated debts for a potential bail-in to work.78 This 
minimum requirement is named as minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities 
(MREL); without it, the loss incurred by a bank in a financial crisis, would be too large for that 
credit institution to fully absorb by either cancelling or converting the MREL to equity. 79 
The BRRD provides national resolution authorities with methods to calculate the minimum 
bail-inable liabilities on an institution by institution base.; also, it proposes to enhance the 
predictability and stability of bail-in mechanism.80 Hence, one may affirm that MREL is an 
                                                             
73 Regulation 2016/860 specifying further the circumstances where exclusion from the application of write-down 
or conversion powers is necessary under Art. 44(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms 
(OJ L 144). 
74 Raffaele Lener and Edoardo Rulli, Liabilities Excluded from Bail-in: Implications under Italian and EU Law 
32 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 430 (2017). 
75 According to Art. 59 BRRD, headed ‘Requirement to write down or convert capital instruments’. 
76 Art 59(3), BRRD, headed ‘Requirement to write down or convert capital instruments’. 
77 See Art. 44(3) in BRRD and Recital 72 of BRRD. Resolution authorities may exclude or partially exclude 
liabilities where necessary to avoid the spreading of contagion and financial instability which may cause serious 
disturbance to the economy of a Member State. When carrying out those assessments, resolution authorities should 
give consideration to the consequences of a potential bail-in of liabilities stemming from eligible deposits held by 
natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises above the coverage level provided for in Directive 
2014/49/EU. 
78 Michael Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions, 288 (OUP 2016). 
79 BRRD art. 45. 
80 Gabriel Moss and others, EU Banking and Insurance Insolvency, 244-245 (2nd Edition OUP 2017). 
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important condition to make the mechanism of bail-ins workable. However, the flip side of the 
coin is that, as the resolution authorities have discretion to subordinate debts in the category of 
MREL to other liabilities, the discretionary exclusion exerted at the time of a banking crisis 
may drive a coach and horses through  the no-creditor-worse-off principle (NCWO) discussed 
in Section 5.81 The tenet of the ‘NCWO principle’ is that the creditors should not suffer more 
losses than they would have incurred in, in cases of liquidation of the institution. Nevertheless, 
the case of the Cypriot Banks bail-in seems to reveal that discretion and manipulation are 
harmful not only for the same insolvency principles but also for  those enshrined in the BRRD, 
which may result in being blatantly breached, particularly the NCWO concept. Even though 
the cases were dealt with before the BRRD, they are still telling and significant. 
On 2013, the Eurogroup and Troika agreed to provide Emergency Liquidity Assistance to 
Cyprus on the condition that two biggest Cypriot banks, the Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus 
Popular Bank (Laiki) would sell their Greek branches and bail-in part of their losses.82 Since 
the Cypriot Banks operated under the auspice of lender of last resort loans from the EU, this 
gave both the Eurogroup and the IMF a strong voice:  ultimately, the best way forward for 
these two banks, according to these international bodies,  was a significant bail-in of uninsured 
deposits in the Bank of Cyprus and Laiki.83 The Cypriot government decided to bail-in these 
banks as it would not have been able to pay insured depositors, had the banks entered national 
insolvency proceedings.84  
Empirically, the resolution plan for Laiki was as follows: its operation and business in Greece 
and Cyprus would be sold to Piraeus Bank and the Bank of Cyprus respectively.85 Also, Laiki 
would be divided into one bad bank and one good bank: more specifically, all the interests of 
shareholders, bondholders and 47.5% of the uninsured deposits would be left in the bad bank 
and wiped out. 86 Despite the reassuring picture, so many flaws and inconsistencies were 
obvious in the rescue plan. Frist, the discretionary power had been exerted so that the 
University of Cyprus which had a large deposit in Laiki, resulted in being exempted. 87 
Additionally, a significant amount of exemptions were made to Greece-based depositors. More 
specifically, Greek depositors in the branches of two banks sold to Piraeus were not subject to 
any haircut, whereas the Cypriot uninsured creditors ended up bearing the disproportionate cost 
of the bail-in. 88 From a hypothetic analysis done by Costas Xiouros, should  Greece-based 
depositors have not been exempt from bail-in, Cypriot depositors of the Bank of Cyprus would 
only account for 17% of bail-inable liabilities rather than the more consistent 47.5%  which 
eventually materialised. Furthermore, the number for Cypriot depositors of Laiki would have 
                                                             
81 Tobias H. Tröger, Why MREL Won’t Help Much SAFE Working Paper No. 180 8 (2017). 
82 Costas Xiouros, Handling of the Laiki Bank ELA and the Cyprus Bail-in Package in Alexander Michaelides 
and Athanasios Orphanides (eds), The Cyprus Bail-In Policy: Lessons from the Cyprus Economic Crisis, 33 
(Imperial College Press 2016). 
83 John Theodore and Jonathan Theodore, Cyprus and the Financial Crisis-The Controversial Bailout and What 
it Means for the Eurozone, para 14.23 (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
84 ibid at para 14.23. 
85 It derives from the above that Bank of Cyprus have continued operating, despite its crisis, mercy of the 
acquisition of the ‘good’ assets from Laiki.  
86 Thomas Philippon and Aude Salord, Bail-ins and Bank Resolution in Europe: A Progress Report, Geneva 
Reports on the World Economy Special Report 4, 32 (2017). 
87 Pamela Lintner and Johanna Lincoln, Bank Resolution and “Bail-In” in the EU: Selected Case Studies Pre and 
Post BRRD,  21 (2016). 
88 John Theodore and Jonathan Theodore, Cyprus and the Financial Crisis-The Controversial Bailout and What 
it Means for the Eurozone, para. 14.102 (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
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been  likely to be 24.5% while in fact, they resulted in bearing up to a more significant figure 
of 60%.89 In other words, depositors in the bank of Cyprus and Laiki were put in a worse 
situation than they would have been in the liquidation scenario of these banks.90 
 
7.2. Uncertainty Regarding the Conditions to Apply Bail-Ins 
Given the uncertainties with regard to the institution-specific MREL,91 the costs for creditors 
may outweigh that of liquidation.92Therefore, it is not clear whether the bail-in tool is always 
the most economical way  for distressed medium or small size financial institutions, which may 
not generate significant externalities to damage the public interest. This is probably the reason 
why resolution tools such as bail-in can only be initiated when some conditions are met so as 
to avoid the possible exorbitant costs to the stakeholders.93 
In section 1, it has been made clear that the resolution tools are designed to apply in extreme 
cases where a financial institution is failing or likely to fail and no alternative options are 
available and it is in the public interest to rescue the financial institution. 94However, the 
interpretation of these three standards, without rigid and well-established practice, may subject 
to resolution authorities’ cooperation and discretion.95That is to say, the BRRD does not make 
it clear when resolution tools should be used. What if the resolution authorities, such as the 
Single Resolution Board, does not agree to rescue a national bank, even though the bank is 
very important to the local economy? What actions should national governments take? This is 
what happened in Italy. 
When two Italian banks Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza found themselves in 
financial difficulties, the SRB was of the opinion that the Banca Popolare di Vicenza and 
Veneto Banca should need not be put in resolution; the banks should be dealt with by the Italian 
national insolvency law as they were not large enough to cause harm to the financial stability 
of the system and a full-out resolution on the basis of public interest was not justified.96 
The opinion of SRB seems to imply that liquidation for these two Italian banks was a cheaper 
and viable option for the Italian government. However, 80% of the junior bonds were sold to 
retail investors and this category would eventually bear the loss in the liquidation 
proceedings.97 The Italian government decided to back up the banks by issuing guarantees of 
up to 12 billion euros to deal with non-performing loans; also the government facilitated Banca 
                                                             
89 Costas Xiouros, Handling of the Laiki Bank ELA and the Cyprus Bail-in Package in Alexander Michaelides 
and Athanasios Orphanides (eds), The Cyprus Bail-In Policy: Lessons from the Cyprus Economic Crisis, 33 
(Imperial College Press 2016). 
90ibid at 84. 
91 Tobias H. Tröger, Why MREL Won’t Help Much SAFE Working Paper No. 180 (2017). 
92 Jens-Hinrich Binder, Proportionality at the Resolution Stage: Calibration of Resolution Measures and the 
Public Interest Test, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2990379 (accessed on 28th 
August 2017). 
93 Ibid at 8. 
94 See section 1.2. 
95 Tobias H. Tröger, Too Complex to Work A Critical Assessment of the Bail -in Tool under the European Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Regime, EBI Working Paper Series No.12, at 13 (2017). 
96 See the Single resolution Board press report at https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/341 (accessed on 26 Aug 2018). 
97  https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-italy-veneto-banks-restructuring-idUKKBN17D2AL (accessed on 26 Aug 
2018); Thomas Philippon and Aude Salord, Bail-ins and Bank Resolution in Europe: A Progress Report, Geneva 
Reports on the World Economy Special Report 4, at 39 (2017). 
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Intesa to acquire the good assets of these banks at the expense of another 5.2 billion euros.98 
From a speech of the deputy governor of the Bank of Italy, the bail-out is probably the best 
option for Italian banks as a potential bail-in may be very expensive and prejudicial to both the 
Italian market and the consumer confidence. 99  However, the actions taken by the Italian 
government represented a quasi-bailout, not a straightforward liquidation.  
The cases may create further uncertainties as to when the bail-in can be applied. The above 
Cypriot case also reveals this issue. It was alleged that, since  the size of economy of Cyprus 
was too small to trigger a knock-on effect in Europe100, and considering that most of depositors 
were Russians and the origin of money nebulous, 101 the resolution authorities Troika and 
Cypriot government decided to let Cypriot to test the bail-in tool. 
 
8. Conclusion  
The bail-in tool was introduced at the dawn of 2016 in the aftermath of both the 2007-2008 
financial crises and the 2011 Euro zone crisis, and it has been heralded as an instrument 
designed to preserve the essential functions of the bank, particularly its ability to remain a 
reliable paymaster. Beyond the intentions of the EU legislation, which are not necessarily 
correct (to keep afloat the bank as paymaster), the way this scope has been achieved, by simply 
targeting certain categories of stakeholders as sacrificial lambs, without any clear definition ex 
ante of the legal criteria, is controversial. Thus, the discretion left to the resolution authority 
seems to mimic a form of Russian roulette, where the dead man walking is one of the major 
stakeholders of the bank, with the resolution authority being the nasty and ruthless killer.   
Against this background, this paper, first and foremost, attempts to provide a legal 
categorisation of the bail-in tool, in light of the general principles of corporate law and 
insolvency law. The bail-in, far from being an insolvency proceeding, as it lacks the 
quintessential element of the par condicio creditorum, is a sui generis instrument of an 
administrative nature.  
In light of the fact that the magnitude of the powers - pretty unfettered - given to the supervisory 
bodies is egregious, the paper has highlighted further that the new EU regulation in this area 
may be tainted with vagueness.102 According to Lord Bingham, one of the guiding principles 
of the rule of law is that the ‘law must be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable’, in order 
that individuals know what conduct is lawful or unlawful.103 Similarly, Raz asserts that the rule 
of law requires that ‘laws should be relatively stable and the making of laws guided by open, 
stable, clear and general rules’.104  
                                                             
98  Mara Monti, Italy versus Spain: Two Measures for Solving The Same Banking Problem (2017) at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/06/28/italy-spain-two-measures-same-banking-problem/. (accessed on 27 
Aug 2018).  
99 https://www.ft.com/content/03a1c7d0-5a61-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220. (accessed on 26 Aug 2018). 
100 John Theodore and Jonathan Theodore, Cyprus and the Financial Crisis-The Controversial Bailout and What 
it Means for the Eurozone, para 14.5 (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
101Thomas Philippon and Aude Salord, Bail-ins and Bank Resolution in Europe: A Progress Report, Geneva 
Reports on the World Economy Special Report 4, at 36 (2017). 
102 In this paper the overlap between bail-in and property rights, which is also an obvious area of doctrinal analysis, 
has been deliberately left outside the perimeter of the investigation. For a commentary on this specific matter, see 
Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Bail-in in the Banking Union 53 Common Market Law Review 116, 118 (2016). 
103 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, London 2011). 
104 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, 214, 218 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1979). 
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By contrast, apart from a quite generic principle of priorities hinted at by the BRRD 
(shareholders to pay first, and senior creditors to pay later), 105  in reality the supervisory 
authority has been made, courtesy of the new rules, the supremo entitled to artificially alter the 
basic ownership structure of the bank. This paper echoes a concern that these powers may 
modify the same principle of hierarchy that in every jurisdiction usually governs the claims of 
creditors. The resolution board, and the multifarious administrative bodies behind it, resembles 
a reincarnation of the mythological figure of Charon. It is he who will decide, among the 
different moribund souls approaching the banks of Hades, the ones who deserve salvation - and 
therefore can be safely navigated across the Styx -  and the ones who by contrast need to loiter 
on the shore. The double standards in the recent case of the Venetian banks, designated major 
banks according to the Single Supervisory Mechanism rules, but all of a sudden reclassified as 
regional banks according to the SRM rules, is further evidence corroborating this assumption.   
Furthermore, the resolution tools and particularly the bail-in tool, after more than two years in 
existence, still lie in a nebulous area as regards their trigger. In preserving the continuation of 
the main activities of the bank, it is still debatable, from a doctrinal point of view, whether the 
tool is a going-concern tool or a gone-concern one. As regards this, better identification and/or 
wording of the concept of ‘failing or likely to fail’ appears necessary, in so much as to limit 
the trigger to the ‘likely to fail’. Ultimately, the failing bank should no longer be allowed the 
resolution tool, as at that point the bank is already insolvent, and therefore orthodox insolvency 
proceedings should apply.  
Additionally, the BRRD seems to be an all-inclusive, but quite confusing, piece of legislation 
where different sedes materiae are interwoven, whereas separate pieces of legislation would 
have been a better modus operandi. The order of priorities that, in the case of the resolution 
tool, can be applied by the resolution authority, the tenor of which is far from clear, could have 
been kept separate from the usual order of priorities, applicable to the insolvency proceedings 
of banks, concerned with the proper bank insolvency.     
Upon close scrutiny, it might be suggested that the recent piece of legislation may have 
preserved the principle of continuation of the fundamental activities of the bank. Yet, the same 
legislation may have given the last rites to the bank as a business entity. In the new scenario, 
the credit institution hardly fits into the concept of entrepreneurial activity, given that the rights 
of the main stakeholders – shareholders and all ordinary creditors - are sacrificed, ad libitum, 
by an overarching and overwhelming public authority, the decisions of which will hang over 
the functioning of the bank like the proverbial sword of Damocles. 
Possible corrections to the BRRD in the area of the bail-in tool are few but certainly urgent. A 
more perspicuous definition, within the legislation, of the major creditors who are going to be 
sacrificed in cases where the bank is likely to fail, is recommended. The initial proposal 
adumbrated in 2012 to identify this category exclusively in those who provide regulatory 
capital to the bank, despite the time and the legislation passed in the meantime, is not 
illogical.106 In a scenario where banks, in the last decennium, have been profoundly dissected 
like corpses at the mercy of fearless doctors in their post-mortem investigations, the new rules 
                                                             
105 See in this Section 4 above. 
106 More recently, when this paper was already complete, an Author (Tobias H. Troeger, Too Complex to Work: 
A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime 4 Journal of 
Financial Regulation 35,72 (2018)) points out that a concentration of private sector involvement falling under the 
minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities is to be preferred.   
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of recapitalisation of banks should protect per se financial institutions. In the state-of-the-art 
current legislation, there is an uncertainty which ultimately may affect the decision of any 
investor to put money into a bank.              
A decennium has now passed since the explosion of the first financial crisis, conventionally 
seen as coinciding with the Northern Rock illiquidity. In celebrating this tragic-comic 
anniversary, a plethora of regulations has been promulgated. These rules may already be 
obsolete, as they were envisaged in a scenario (the ‘big bank’ of the 2000) which in the 
meantime has been superseded by a more fragmented market of small-medium institutions. 
The example of the Venetian banks, major players in the market and also regarded as major 
banks according to the SRM rules, yet exempt from the bail-in, may be a paradigm.     
In this regulatory furore, the administrative tool of the resolution of the bank, instead of 
clarifying the exit rules applicable to the bank, may have simply created a proliferation of 
norms, in some cases in contradiction with one another. Ultimately, it can be legitimately 
questioned whether the BRRD and its underpinning philosophy, in preserving the concept of 
the bank as paymaster, in reality signs the death warrant of the bank as it has been organised 
and has survived until recently since its mediaeval ancestors. The BRRD may have achieved 
the internalisation of the losses of the bank and one of the main pillars of the Banking Union,107 
but at the same time it may have caused an irremediable disentanglement of the legal discipline 
of the bank from the law of corporations and the insolvency law. In a contribution published 
when the BRRD and the bail-in had just entered into force, it was authoritative observed that 
bail-in is ‘a game changer and a cornerstone of the Banking Union’ and that this any new 
regulatory tool ‘will prove its utility only in real life and in the course of time’.108 More than 
two years on it is possible to already affirm that the bail-in has been a disappointing experience 
and the empirical cases examine may confirm the assumption.         
A final and provocative idea is to close one’s eyes and to imagine, for a few minutes, what 
would have happened if, during the dramatic nights of October 2008, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland had not been rescued by the British Government. Perhaps an astute novelist, such as 
Frederick Forsyth, would have narrated that major banks would suffer from the contagion and 
a widespread chain reaction of bank insolvency proceedings would ensue. Nonetheless, the 
market would have restarted according to its usual dynamics, even stronger than before and 
with a new mission, something that after 10 years is still difficult to see in Europe. In other 
words, in the rhetoric of the post-financial crisis, it is suggested that bail-outs have saved the 
world. However, this probably ignores the fact that not only has the economy failed to get 
better, but that also it is now even worse, given the lack of clarity of the new caliginous, 
contradictory, ‘non-legal’ and technocratic rules of the BRRD, particularly those in the area of 
the bail-in tool. In Florence and Venice, during the Renaissance, and even prior to that during 
the Middle Ages, bankers used to fail quite frequently, and failure was symbolised by the act 
of the court officer breaking the desk. This conduct was defined in the Italian spoken in these 
cities as ‘rompere il banco’, or ‘banco rotto’, from where we get the English term ‘bankruptcy’. 
Florence and Venice were opulent cities, the wealthiest at that time, and yet even along their 
streets bankers used to be subject to insolvency from time to time. Perhaps, six centuries on, 
that same spirit needs be rekindled along the streets of contemporary Europe.                  
                                                             
107 This aspect is emphasised by Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Bail-in in the Banking Union 53 Common Market Law 
Review 138 (2016). 
108 Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Bail-in in the Banking Union 53 Common Market Law Review 138 (2016). 
 20 
 
Bibliography 
  
Alvaro, S., Lamandini, M., Muñoz, RD., Ghibellini, E., Pellegrini, F. MREL Securities after 
BRRD: the Interplay between Prudential, Resolution and Transparency Requirements and the 
Challenges which Lie Ahead, CONSOB, Commissione Nazionale per le Societa’ e la Borsa, 
Quaderni Giuridici, (2017) 
Andenas, M., Avesani, EG., Manes, P., Vella, F., Wood, PR., Solvency II: a Dynamic 
Challenge for the Insurance Market (Il Mulino, Bologna 2017) 
Armour, J., Awrey D., Davies, P., Enriques, L., Gordon, JN., Mayer, C and Payne, J Principles 
of Financial Reuglation (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016) 
Arnaboldi, F Deposit Guarantee Schemes: A European Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2014) 
Avgouleas,  E and Goodhart, C An anatomy of Bank Bail-ins: Why the Eurozone needs a Fiscal 
Backstop for the Banking Sector, 5th December 2016, European Economy. Banks, Regulation, 
and the Real Sector, 75,90 in <http://european-economy.eu/2016-2/an-anatomy-of-bank-bail-
ins-why-the-eurozone-needs-a-fiscal-backstop-for-the-banking-sector> 
Avgouleas, E and Cullen, J Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the 
Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries 42 Journal of Law and Society 
28,50 (2014).  
Avgouleas, E and Goodhart, C Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins Journal of Financial 
Regulation 3-29 (2015) 
Ayadi, R and Lastra, RM Proposals for Reforming Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Europe 11 
Journal of Banking Regulation 210,222 (2010) 
Binder, J-H and Singh,  D (eds), Bank Resolution: the European Regime (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2016) 
Binder, JH Proportionality at the resolution stage: Calibration of resolution measures and 
the public interest test available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2990379 (accessed on 28th August) 
(2017) 
Bingham, T The Rule of Law (Penguin, London 2011) 
Boccuzzi, G The European Banking Union (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2016) 
Capriglione, F Financial Crisis and Sovereign Debt. The European Union Between Risks and 
Opportunities (1) Law and Economics Yearly Review 4,76 (2012) 
Carabellese, P de Gioia and Chessa, C The So-Called Pan-European Depositors’ Protection 
Scheme: a Further Euro Own-goal? A Critical Analysis of Directive 2014/49 23 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 241,260 (2016) 
Carabellese, P de Gioia Corporate governance of British Banks and Duties of Directors: 
Practical Implications of the Royal Bank of Scotland’s Demise 2 Law and Economics Yearly 
Review 134,165 (2014) 
Chorafas, DN Banks, Bankers, and Bankruptcies Under Crisis. Understanding Failure and 
Mergers during the Great Depression (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2014)  
Cranston, R Principles of Banking Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002)  
De Poli, M European Banking Law (Wolters Kluwer Italia, Assago 2017) 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Kane, E and Laeven, L Deposit Insurance around the World: a 
Comprehensive Analysis and Database 20 Journal of Financial Stability 155,183 (2015) 
 21 
 
Dombret, A and Kenadjan, PS (eds), The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. Europe’s 
Solution for “Too Big to Fail”? (Walter de Gruyter – Institute for Law and Finance Series, 
Berlin and Boston 2013) 
Ellinger, EP., Lomnicka, E and Hare, CVM Ellingers’ Modern Banking Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2011)  
Financial Sector Advisory Center (FinSAC), Bank Resolution and “Bail-in” in the EU: 
selected Case Studies Pre and Post BRRD. World Bank Group, 2017, in 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/120651482806846750/FinSAC-BRRD-and-Bail-In-
CaseStudies.pdf (accessed on 31 January 2017) 
Financial Stability Board, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices - Implementation 
Standards in http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf (accessed on 
3 July 2014) (September 2009) 
Financial Times, Why Italy’s €17bn bank rescue deal is making waves across Europe 
https://www.ft.com/content/03a1c7d0-5a61-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220  (accessed on 26 Aug 
2018) 
Gross, K Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (Yale University Press, 
New Haven 1997) 
Gross, K Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: an Essay 72 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 1031,1048 (1994) 
Haentjens M., and Wessels B. (eds), Bank Recovery and Resolution. A Conference 
Book (Eleven Publishers, The Hague 2014) 
Haentjens, M and Wessels, B. (eds), Research Handbook on Crisis Management in the Banking 
Sector (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2015) 
Haentjens, M Bank Recovery and Resolution: An Overview of International Initiatives 
International Insolvency Law Review 255,270 (2014) 
Hess, B., Oberhammer, P and Pfeiffer, T European Insolvency Law The Heidelberg-
Luxemburg-Vienna Report (CH Beck, Hart and Nomos, Munich 2013) 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-italy-veneto-banks-restructuring-idUKKBN17D2AL 
(accessed on 26 Aug.2018) 
Hudson, A Hudson The Law of Finance (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2013) 
Iwanicz-Drozdowska, M (ed), European Bank Restructuring during the Global Financial 
Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan, London 2016) 
Iwanicz-Drozdowska, M., Smaga, P., Witkowski, B. Bank Restructuring in the EU. Which Way 
to Go? 38 Journal of Policy Modeling 572,586 (2016) 
J Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1979) 
Jackson, T Bankruptcy, Non-bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain 91 Yale Law 
Journal 857,907 (1982) 
Jackson, T The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy (Harvard Press, Harvard 1986) 
LaBrosse, JR., Olivares-Caminal, R and Singh, D., The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive – Some Observations on the Financial Arrangements 15 Journal of Banking 
Regulation 218-226 (2014)   
Lener, R and Rulli, E Liabilities Excluded from Bail-in: Implications under Italian and EU 
Law 32 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 428,438 (2017) 
Lintner, P and Lincoln, J Bank resolution and “Bail-in” in the EU: selected case studies pre 
and post BRRD  (2016)  
M Schillig, Resolution and insolvency of banks and financial institutions (OUP 2016)  
 22 
 
Mayes, DG and Liuksila, A (eds), Who Pays for Bank Insolvency (Palgrave USA, Basingstoke 
2016) 
McBryde, WW Flessner A., and Kortmann, SCJJ Principles of European Insolvency Law 
Volume 4 (Kluwer Legal Publishers, Deventer 2003)  
Mecklenburg, C and Guzman, A Financial Crisis Management (Grin, Munich 2011) 
Mezzacapo, S Towards a New Regulatory Framework for banking Recovery and Resolution in 
the EU (2) Law and Economics Yearly Review (Part 1) 213,241 (2013) 
Monti, M Italy versus Spain: Two measures for solving the same banking problem (2017) 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/06/28/italy-spain-two-measures-same-banking-
problem/. 
Mooney,  C and Morton, G Harmonizing Insolvency Law for Intermediated Securities: the Way 
Forward, in T Keijser (ed), Transnational Securities Law 193,239(Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2014) 
Moss, G and others EU banking and insurance insolvency (2nd Edition OUP 2017) 
Payne, J The Reform of Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Europe 12 European Company and 
Financial Law Review 539,562 (2015) 
Peihani, M A Bail-in Regime for Distressed Banks: the View from Canada 31 Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 237,240 (2016) 
Philippon, T and Salord, A Bail-ins and Bank Resolution in Europe: A Progress Report 
Geneva Reports on the World Economy Special Report 4 (2017) 
Russo, CA The New Course of EU State Aid rules during the 2007-09 Financial Crisis, in K 
Alexander & R Dhumale (eds), Research Handbook on International Financial Regulation 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK) and Northampton (MA – USA 2012) 
Sergakis, K The Law of Capital Markets in the EU (Palgrave Macmillan Corporate and 
Financial Law Series, 2018 forthcoming) 
Siclari, M Italian Banking and Financial Law: Crisis Management Procedures, Sanctions, 
Alternative  
 The Single resolution Board press report at https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/341 (2017) 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2015) 
Theodore, J and Theodore, J Cyprus and the financial crisis-the controversial bailout and 
what it means or the Eurozone para 14.23. (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 
Troegler, TH Too Complex to Work: a Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the 
European Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime 4 Journal of Financial Regulation 35,72 
(2018) 
Tröger, TH.  Why MREL Won’t Help Much SAFE Working Paper No. 180  
Tröger, TH. Too Complex to Work A Critical Assessment of the Bail -in Tool under the 
European Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime EBI Working Paper Series No.12 (2017) 
Wessels, B and Moss, G EU Banking and Insurance Insolvency (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2006) 
Wojcik, K-P. Bail-in in the Banking Union 53 Common Market Law Review 91 (2016) 
Xiouros, C Handling of the Laiki Bank ELA and the Cyprus Bail-in Package in The Cyprus 
bail-in policy lessons from the Cyprus economic crisis Edited by Alexander Michaelides and 
Athanasios Orphanides (Imperial College Press 2016)  
 
